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PROPOSED MODEL FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR HAINAN 
INTRODUCTION: 
~ . 
Th e l"epo ·rt: claims to ad va nc e the basis for formulating the new 
l aws required _to establish a 
financial sys t em. Before 
seem a ppropriate t o 
available evidence. 
n(·~:;,.-J '' ·::.(:< c 5.. -:·0.1 5.. ::::. t: '' 1nr:)d E: l 
those laws are written, 
assess t he proposal 
·f C• ·r~ I-·! .:::. i rN, Et r-, ' ~::. 
h () ;~,.J E~:: t .. ..: f.·:·! ,.- ~ :L t: 
in lic:iht: ()f 
- . 
Two kinds of investigations could have been conducted to assess 
the proposed model's uti li ty in the Hainan circum~ t ance: 1) a~ 
0nalysis of the evidence des i gned . to reveal the historically-
s haped causes of inadequacy of Hainan's present financial system 
to l ay a basis for considerat io n of the range of possib l e 
proposa l s that might help to overcome the~; aMd 2) . a t horough~ 
going review of __ the experiences of the many th ird world countries 
which have a l ready adop ted a finan cia l sys t em like that here 
1:::or·or•o<:::.ec! .. 
Unfortunately, although they spent 35 days in Hainan, th e 
report shows no ind ication that it s authors undertook either kind 
of investigation. Instead, they adopted the conventional 
capitalist wisdom -- pr?pagated throughout the third world by the 
International Montary Fund (IMF) -- which ASSUMES - that the ca uses 
of underdevelopment in Hainan (and other third world countries) 
lie in the lack of a financial system with the characteristics 
th ey propose . Th ~y apparently conclude tha~ Hainan should adopt 
thi s model on the basis of thi s untested asumption . Far f rom \ 
bE? in Cl ,;:, n i:."'.? ';J II s ocial is t II fOrm, h C•',•Jf:? \1 E~ "I" , < :i_ t "(('? r.:n- e~~(;?rrt ~; t h (? 0 l d 
model which the Internationa l Monetary Fund CIMFl has sought to 
impose on all developing countries -- one which economists of a ll 
but the mos~ monetarist peisuasion tend to reject • 
Hav i ng never been i n Hainan y I make no pretense to having made 
the first k ind of inves tiga t ion. I consider such an 
investigation a~so lutely essentia l , however, before anyone can 
usef ully propose a new financial system. Ev en without ever having 
Geen th ere ~ I wo uld like to emphasize that Hainan's history and 
institutions in no wa y resemble those of Hong Kong which the 
authors o f the r eport . suggest as an important sour~e of th e ideas 
in their proposal. More usefully, perhaps~ I can provide 
evidence of the ex per ien ce of other developing countries ( 1 ) 
1 For 25 years, I taught and conduc t ed research i n Ghana , 
Ta n za ni a, Zambia and Zim babwe (as head of the Economics 
Department of t he Universities in the l ast twol; and, working 
with graduate students in Clark Un i ve rsi t y i n the United States, 
have co nduct e d investigations in t o Asian and La t in American 
countries' financia l systems. I hav e written a number o f 
articles on relevant issues, and a textboo k , Money, Ba nking and 
·"':· 
which may shed l igh t on the diffic ul ties th e proposed financial 
system may impose on the peo ple of Hainan. 
The remainder of this memor and um first outlines th e model 
proposed by the authors of ~he report; and then considers the 
conseq uences of its adoption in other developin~ countr~es . 
THE MODEL PROPOSED IN THE REPORT:(2) 
Th ~ Central Bank : 
StFictly in accoy-cl wit h "western" monetary theo r y¥ the.,? r·e por·t 
proposes that Haina n es tablish a Central tank, separate a nd apart 
fr om th e _ Pe opl es Bank of China ¥ ~ith branches and s ubbranches in 
Hainan ' s economic regions responsi ble o nl y to it. Th e Cent r al 
Bank's three main functions would include: l) issuing a curre nc y 
(separate and apar t from that of the rest of China, c a lled th e 
"Qi orHJ B.}. " l; 2) per- f orming the _.func:t ions of the~ b ,3. nk of Ha.i.n;;:1.n'~:; 
government, ie hand ling its finan ces; and 3) serving as a bank 
for the commeFcial banks. Wh i l e the CentFal Bank shou l d 
. . 
coope rate wit h the Hainan government, it should be as 
independent of government as possibl e in mak ~ngy supervising and 
e nfor c ing monetary po licy. The Cen t ra l Ba nk ' s primary 
instrument ~ for influencing monetary policy s hould be the 
indirect techniques typicall y used 1n developed capita list 
econpmies, na~e ly, the interest rate, the reserve ra tio , and o pe n 
ma rket operations. 
The commercia l banks: 
As recommend ed by orthodox wes~ern t ex t booksy the repor t 
proposes that th e commercia l bark s be es t a bli s hed as e nterprises, 
own~d by shaFeholdeFs, entiFely o ut si de of gove r nmen t con t ro l . 
Shar e holdeFs may include individua l s a nd o the r en t erprises or 
bank s; , •.;.,Jht::'t.: h£"!1'. c:l.:::.mt:;~~:::. t.i.cr 'fol'.E·~:.l.!;in, .::.y- j.::):.i..ni:.:J.y h e l d. The!::-E:· 
comme F cial banks would f unction like commercial banks in mo~ t 
capita li s t count ries, taking in domestically-generated savinqs 
and lendi ng fund s to fi nance projects which their managers 
Public Finance in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1986), which, in 
light of the African experience, specifi cally considers 
alteFnative theo retica l and pr-actic a l approaches to finance for 
dr::?ve lopment. 
2 This section summarizes the pr-oposa l as in~eFpFeted into 
English by s tudents of mr . Chi Hai Bin at Pekig University. I 
wish to e xpress my deep gratitude to them foF the wondey-ful job 
they did in a brief time period. If I under s t a nd the proposal 
correc tly, it coin cides a lmost in its entir-ety with the typic a l 
model proposed e lsewhe re by the IMF and other monetarist 
thE~()!'" i~.t!:~. 
calculate wi ll produce an adeq~ate rate of profit . Th e report 
e xplicitly ar gues that fo reign ban ks, wor ki ng as potent i al 
sources of for e ign f unds t ogether wi th foreign enterprisesf will 
likely p lay a leading role . Th e a uthor s v iew this as essentia l 
to f ue l wh a t they anti c ipa t e wi ll be a fo re ign investment boom . 
Non - bank f inan cial institutions: 
recommends the establishment of other financial Th e repol" t 
in<::. t it u. t io n<::. , 
_ gov~:':!l'"nmE:nt . 
i:?.. l ~=-0 
Th E~se 
c redit cooperatives, 
Foreig n as well as 
may o•,Jn s ha r"~.:? ~=­
thE~il'" boc-:\r d :::; o:::.·f 
in 
as shaye-held en terpri ses s e par a t e from the 
s hould include insuranc e companies, rura l 
investment cor por a tions, and l easing firms . 
domestic ind iv iduals, banks ~ nd enterprises 
t hese, and bank representa tives may serve on 
di 1" ecto1"s . . 
As a key . fe a tur e o f Hainan's new money marketf th e repor t 
recommends creation of a s tock exchanqe where individual~ and 
ins titut ions can buy and s ell shares of ownel'"sh ip in the pyoposed 
new finan cia l institutions as well as pr o ductiv e and trading 
<:0 n t ~:.~ ·r p 1" i. ~::.e!::;. 
Foreign exchange market: 
The report proposes that all enterprises, including banks and 
financi a l ins titutions, whether domestic or foreign-owned , should 
be allowed to participate in a newl y-created mar ket for foreign 
exchange. These enterprises ' demand for foreign currencies , in 
r elation to the available s upply, s hould determine the ra te of 
e:,;ch ,3. nge (thE~ "m,3.rket price") of Hc.':\i n .:;;l.n ' ~:=.. n!i?';J CIJrrency, thr:.::' Oiong 
Bi. The report recommends that represe ntatives of t he commercial 
banks meet weekly with the Central Bank to determine the Oiong 
Bi's exchange rate. Hoping to create anot her c hannel to bring in 
foreign exchange, the report proposes to enlaYge the foYeign 
exchange market to include foreign currency debentuYes and stoc k. 
THE EVIDENCE FROM OTHER DEVELOfiNG COUNTRIES : 
Except for the proposed foreign exc hange 
model is not new . With variations 
hi s t or i cal ci rcumstances, it constitutes 
mar ket , thi s proposed 
Yef lect ing di ff erent 
the financi a l system 
funct ioning in mos t thir d wo rld co un tri e s th a t have no ~ seY iously 
a ttempted t o implement a tr ansition to socia lism . Under IMF 
pressure, a f ew countries, like Zambia and Gh ana, have even 
ado pt ed an auc t ion syst e m, a ma r ket for f oreign exchange no t 
unlik e that recomme nded by th e repor t . Hence extensive e vidence 
exists as to this model ' s likely consequences for a de ve l op in g 
countr y lik e Hainan. Here, a f ew e xampl es may se r ve to 
illustrate the expe r iences that, in many parts of the third 
world, have led t o widespread criticisms of the proposed 
The role of private commercial banks: 
The report anticipa tes _that, both directly a nd indirectly, the 
private commercial banks will play a crucial role in · the proposed 
financial sy~tem. The _banks' own policies, as well as their role 
in financial institutions that provide long -term cap~tal, will 
c:lin:::::ctly 2\·f·f ect the 21mount, cost, -:·HKI clirE~ttion of tl"E:•c:lit. In 
addition, they will indirect ly help . to shape macroeconomic 
mea~ures through their influence on the centr01 bank and monetary 
policies, including those affecting the foreign exchange value of 
the Q~.on9 bi. 
Like the conventiona l western monetary theory 
based, . the report assumes that commercial 
on whic h it is 
bank!; p l .~y an 
3 Given the shortage of space, the analysis below 0ill 
fo~us primarily on evidence dr0wn from Zimbabwe where together 
with a number of students I spent 3 years (1980-83) investigating 
the details of the way the financia l institutions functioned. 
Zimbabwe 9 like Hong Kong, was formerly a British colony called 
Southel"n . Rhode~:.i,::t. For- t•,;o dr~c<::o.d('2S .::·.·ftr?·r t'Jo·r"ld ~'J .::;~.r- II, thF:: 
British viewed Zimbabwe as a pot e ntial regi o~al su J c e~ t er ( no t 
unlike Hong Kong, ex cept that Zimbabwe is not an island, but a 
landlocked country with close li nks to South Africa) for its 
southern African colonies. In 1980, Zimbabwe won independence . 
Its population of almost eight million (compar e d to Hainan ' s six 
million), inhabits a la nd area of 150,000 square miles, more than 
ten times the size of Ha inan. It enjoys a range of mineral ancl 
ag~icultural resour ces. At independence its average per capita 
income was US$780, but the average per capita income of the 
peasants (60% of the population) was less than US$70 . 
During 15 years before independence, the previous regime (ruled 
by a 3% <white> mino r ity) created a financial system with most of 
the characteristics of the model the report proposes for Hainan. 
The p ·r.ima·r"y ~;;;;,;c(·?ption .,,eo.<:~ th ~·1t, u.nc! P 'r condition·;,,. o ·f Jnited 
Nations sanctions (designed to hasten Zi mbabwe' s liberation), the 
government intervened directly to prevent the transnational 
corporate affi liates (that control an estimated 70% of the 
nation's modern capital assets) from remitting profits ~o their 
home countries. For the first 10 years, the financial 
institutions together with the tr-ansnational corporations managed 
to accumulate anc:l reinvest LOCALLY GENERATED INVESTABLE SURPLUSES 
to achieve a an industrial growth rate of 8-10%. In the context 
of the re~1ime'=; 21pa r theid policies, this; " c:levelopmE~nt" bc=~nefittt=-~d 
only the (white) minority and the transnational corporate 
.::\·ffi liates; th.::\t O:•W n 70% of thf? as:.s;E·~t~:; in the ~;o-·c:'"'·ll£~~c:l ''modern '' 
sector. The declining real living standards of the mass of the 
workers and peasants fueled the guerilla st ru9gle that finally 
led to libera tion . 
essen ti a lly tec hnical . ro l e in the financial system. In the cou r s e 
of ~ ompetino with ea ch o t~er 9 they supposedly crea~ e an d all o cate 
funds in an optimal pattern . The evidence from developing 
cotlntries, however, proves that, on the contrary, their policies 
typically have serious negative consequences for small developing 
countries like Hainan. 
First 9 seeking to maximize profits, private commercial banks 
make loans to the sectors that prom1se the highest short-ter m 
profits. In almost every country in Africa, for examp l e, 
private commercial banks lend funds pr~marily to ~irms engaged in 
foreign and internal wholesale tr a de, speculative rea l e state 
Ceg. office bui l di n gs and hotels) 9 and a limited array of last-
stage assembly and processing industries. Thus they he l p finance 
the growth of urban centers that primarily service the export of 
crude agricu ltural, minera l products, and light manufactures 
p roduc e d with th e ch ea p l abor ge nerated by underdevelopment; and 
t he import of high cost lux u r y a nd semi- luxury ma nu fact u res for 
the narrow high income groups who ca n a~fo~d the m. · Th ey l e nd 
litt l e to African farmers, small African businesses, or 
i ntegrated manufacturing industries. As a result, th e ir iending 
practices aggravate uneven, externally-dependent development that 
t e nd s to impoverish the majority of the population, especia l ly 
the poorest segments in the neglected hinterlands, whi l e leavi n g 
th e nationa l ecG no my increasing l y vulnerable to exter na l eco nomic 
fl u ctuations. 
Second, as the report itself admits, forei gn banks tend to 
domina te the domestic deve l oping country ' s banking scene. 
Trans nat ional corporate ba n ks may hold a majority of s hares , have 
representatives on the board of directors, and control the local 
banks' management. Thro ugh the local bank, as well as through 
additional sh0reholdings and their exercise of management 
fu n ctions, foreign banks may also co ntrol th e non-b a nk fina nc ial 
institutions. 
Contrary to the report ' s nai~e assumption, foreign domination 
of d o mestic commercial banks typically does NOT ensure an 
increased flow of for ei gn funds into the country. Rather it 
eanbles tr a nsa t ional banks to use domestic banking and financial 
institutions to accum ulate domestic a lly-generated funds to 
finance f oreign firms ' l ocal l y-inc o r porated affi l iates. In 
Zimbabwe, t he head of the Anglo American Group(4) explained to 
4 The Anglo America n Gro u p is a large transnational holdinq 
company, estimat6d to be the 25th large~t in th e world. Based o~ 
Sou th Africa ' s rich diamond and gold mines, with holdings in 
fir ms t hat dominate most of th a t country ' s indus t ries, it has 
extens i ve US and British ties. Besides control l i n g mines , 
i ndustries a nd t rad i ng firms in a lmos t e very s outher n Af rican 
count ry , i t has c l ose l inks wit h t heir commercial banks ; in 
Zimbabwe, for examp l e, t he Group ·has represe n ta t ives o n the 
boards · of dfrectofs of bo t h Barc l ays and Standard Banks (two 
British banks that together control about 2/3 of Zimba~we ' s 
our student researchers that the Group a lmost never brought 
capital into the country; it relied; instead, on its contacts 
with financial institutions in the coun try t o mobilize and direct 
locally-geherated investable surpluses to finance its Zimbabwean 
b IJ S j_ rlf:? ~;; ~==· • 
Th.:i..r·dy b£:>c:au~;!::Y th e ··fo::o1re.i.(;!n C:()fTlfTlE''I"Cic\ l '' b<"lnk~5 <::\nc:l ··fin<::tnc:ial 
institutions aim primarily to ma~imize their globa l profits, they 
assist, rather than thwarty transnational · cor porate efforts to 
transfer profits out of the coun try . Zimbabwe's post-
i ndE·: p£,!ncl c: n c r::" uo vt::r· rwH·c'nt c: h ·;:,\ r .. ; ~;w:.•d thE~ p 1·  F!:'V .i. out;. ' 1,. eeti filf.7'' s. pl" oh :i. bit: .i c•n 
and permitted foreign firms to remi t 50% of their a fter-ta~ ­
profits(5). Neverth eless, · transnatio~al corp6rations continued 
to e~tract an additiona l outflow, estimated at 10% to 15% of the 
total value of the nation 's fo reiet n trade, through t ransfer 
pricing. Authorized to implement the country's fo rei gn e~change 
regulations, the comm~rcia l banks made no effort · to monitor and 
halt this illegal activity. This should not come as a surprise, 
hovJF!!VE'lr, · ~::.in c:r:::: -tht::7 t l" ~~.nsn.:1tiona.l ~::. cr:::;n~::.t :i. t u ted the br::lnks-' ma . .i. n 
clif::nt~::;. (6) 
But the proposed banking reforms for Hainan go even f Urt he r. · 
Th ey would give the commercial banks the righ t to preside over a 
currency exchange market which would set th e exchange rate for 
the Qionq Bi in light of their clients ' demands in relation to 
supply~ Yet the foreign banks' clients' inter~st in a given 
exchange rate must inevitably diverge from Hainan' s. 
Transnational corporations buyinet Hainan's raw materia l or light 
industrial ex po r ts would prefer a lower va lue for the Qiong Bi 
commercial bank assets), and owns its own merchant bank and 
discount house. Directly and through the banks it owns the 
controlling shares, has representatives on the boards of 
directors, and contro l s the l eading insurance firms that do about 
80% of Zim babwe's insurance business, as well as pension funds. 
These relationships give the Gr ou p access to th e acc um ulated 
insurance and pension funds saved over the years by Zimb~bwea~ 
ci tizens , providing the finances wich enabled the Gr oup to 
purchase controlling shares in almost every se c tor of the 
Zimbabwea n e conomy . 
5 Designed in accor d with conventional western wisdom that 
Zimbabwe must create a hospitable i nvestment c lima t e to attr2 c t 
f oreign capital, this relaxati on l ed to an increase in reported 
profit outflows from about $80 million in 1979 to about $250 
million in 1981. In return v new foreign capi t al investments in 
Zimbabwe reached only about $25million, 10% o f the e~panded 
r:::r u t ·f 1 o•,.}. 
6 By paying very hieth reinsura nce premiums to their parent 
fi rms (mainly in South Africa) fo r which Zimbabwe nev6r recei ved 
any benefity foreign insurance companies, alone~ transferred out 
an· estimated $30 mi ll ion annually. 
7 
which , i n effect, wo u ld lower th e p ri ce they would have t o pa y 
for th ose exports. But a low Oiong Bi exchange r ate wou ld r 0 i se 
the cos t of al l th e ma c hinery , equ ipme n t and ma terial im po rt s 
required to implement Hainan ' s industrial program . Furthermore, 
the foreign banks' transnational clients would more likely be 
able to purchase most of Hainan's scar c0 f or e i qn exchanqe to 
import profitable (luxury or sefui-lu~ury) items. t~8Y wou ld ieave 
litt le foreign exchange for to Hainan's s malier (private or~ 
pub l ic) firms to buy the imported inputs they woud require to 
compete effectively. thi s was Zambia' s e x per ience Wheri , under 
IMF pressure, it attempted to create a market for foreign 
exc hange. I·ts currency's value d ropped to a fracti o n of it s 
form e r l evel. At th e same time , only a handful of the largest 
importing firms could afford to purchase foreign exchange. 
As a re~ ult, many sma ll Zambian firms went out of busine ss. 
Th e report's proposal that the Hainan foreign exchange ~arket 
s hould deal in future exchange rates ne glects the ad d ed dange r of 
spec ul ation. It fail s to consider the fact that the banks might 
use th e ir pr o posed insider status in the exchange market to 
engage in th a t speculation, fo s te r ing grea t 2 r, not l e ss yc u rr e nc y 
ins tability. 
The limit e d Centr a l Bank ro le : 
By gr a nting th e commercial banks the key ro l e in th e 
model~ the reforms would simultaneous ly reduce the 
bank's potential i n flue nce over th e banking system and 
poli cy. 
propose d 
cent r a l 
monetary 
Unlike a sociali s t banking system, the privatization of the 
commercial banks will eliminate the central bank's capacity to 
monitor the financial activities of e nterprises by examining 
their ban k transactions. Th roughout the thi r d wor ld private 
banks insist on protecting th e ir clie nts' anonymity. 
Furthe r more, the central bank's power to influence the direction 
of cred i t wi ll g reatly d i mi nish as p r i va te (especially foreign 
private) banks may refuse to lend a t a ll, rath er th an lend to the 
areas defined by central bank criteria. 
The central bank ' s powers to e ns ur e the stabiity of th e Qiong 
Bi will al s o be reduced~ Presumably, the purpose of keep ing Qiong 
Bi separate and distinct from the mainland c ur re ncy is to prevent 
a ny instability introduced by the Hainan experiment f r om 
affecting th e mainland economy(7) . Es tablishment o f the proposed 
7 It might be noted that by restricting the currenc y to 
Hainany alone, the proposal also restric t s access from Hainan to 
the mainland market. Given that Hainan alone is economically too 
smal l to permit economies of sca l e required fo~ vertically 
integrated industries~ this r estriction will likely ca use fo r eign 
inves tor s to focus primarily on raw ma teri a l e xports or las t -
stage assembly and processing industries which will contribute 
l it tl e t o the desired pattern of industria l development. 
